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Large online platforms, like Airbnb or Amazon Marketplace, increasingly direct users to
internal search engines that limit the number of sellers consumers observe. We show that
such behaviour is consistent with prot maximisation. To do so, we model buyer-seller
interactions as a series bipartite graphs, which are each realised with a probability chosen
by the platform owner. Prominent players disproportionately increase competition, which
decreases prices. To maximise prot, the platform owner ensures that buyers only observe
a consistent number of sellers in every state of the world realised with positive probability.
When products are vertically dierentiated, the platform owner biases observation towards
high-quality products, but doing so reduces prices, and, as a result, the optimal number
of sellers in the network. The extent to which platforms in dierent markets highlight
high-quality products and the number of sellers their search processes show is a function
of both quality dispersion and substitutability.
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Thank you also to Sanjeev Goyal, Mihai Manea, Matthew Elliott, Meg Meyer and participants at conferences
at Stony Brook Game Theory Festival, the Paris School of Economics and the Northwestern-Paris-Oxford
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1 Introduction
Many economic interactions occur in settings where sellers are only able to sell to a subset of
buyers. This stratication might occur, for example, because: sellers are unable to supply some
consumers due to geographic constraints or due to consumer preferences (see, for example,
Spiegler, 2006); consumers might be uncertain which rms are active in a market, as in
Janssen and Rasmusen (2002); . In such settings, a seller potentially faces dierent levels of
competition for each individual consumer that they can supply - some buyers could be supplied
by a large number of sellers, while others may only be able to buy goods from a single seller.
Buyers online platforms generally only observe a subset of sellers in any given market.
Ringer and Skiera (2016) nd that 99.9% of potential buyers of LCD TV sets only observe
sixteen of a possible 1,124 products on a German price comparison website. Similarly, Kim,
Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010) examine the camcorder market on Amazon and nd
that the median search set for consumers of these products was eleven out of a total of more
than ninety camcorders available on the platform.
By choosing a search environment, owners of large online platforms choose which buyers
observe which sellers, and how many sellers eectively compete with one another. Consumers
do not tend to engage as much with results lower down on a search page or products not on
the rst page of search results (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001, Baye et al, 2009 and Baye et al
2016) and almost all modern-day online platforms use ordered search with limited results per
page as the dominant method of navigating products in a market.
While there are behavioural explanations (e.g. rational inattention, see Hefti and Heinke,
2015) for the similarity in the search environments of online platforms, we show that presenting
users with a xed number of sellers is consistent with prot maximisation on a monopoly plat-
form. While limiting number of products consumers observe reduces total sales, the platform
is willing to forego some buyer-seller matches in order to increase prices.
We examine a case where search is decentralised in the sense that each buyer observes each
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seller with some independent probability, but each observation probability is itself randomly
determined. We nd that a platform owner prefers a distribution of observation probabilities
to a symmetric mean-preserving spread of that distribution; the case where some sellers are
randomly more prominent than others is costly. A prominent seller in this setting faces more
competition in expectation and therefore sets a relatively low price, lowering prices across the
network.
This insight, combined with the observation that the platform owner has an incentive to
avoid settings where consumers observe a large amount of products is prot increasing for the
platform, implies that an environment where consumers observe the same number of sellers
on average is always optimal, as this maximises seller price for a given number of buyer-seller
interactions. Real-life search environments generate precisely this set-up as they regulate the
number of sellers observed by buyers, such that sellers know how many competitors they face
in a given market.
We also analyse the case where goods are vertically dierentiated. We nd that the plat-
form has the incentive to bias consumer observation towards high-quality sellers. Doing so,
however, increases the probability that sellers compete with a high-quality seller, which gen-
erates an incentive to reduce the number of sellers in the market.
Markets in which quality dispersion is high tend to result in higher prots, as the platform
is able to increase the probability that high-quality sellers are observed. Whether the number
of sellers observed by buyers is higher or lower than markets with low-quality depends on
product substitutability. If products are not that substitutable, then the competition eects
associated with a high-quality seller being observed dominate, and so fewer sellers are observed
on average when quality dispersion is high.
However, when products are highly substitutable, there are few competitors in the market
to start with, and the cost of missing out on sellers near the top of the quality distribution is
in expectation higher when quality is highly dispersed, so the platform shows more sellers to
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the buyers in this setting compared to the case where seller quality is more similar.
Our analysis therefore generates testable predictions about the structure of the search
environment on dierent platforms, which we summarise in the following diagram:
Figure 1: The optimal number of sellers on a platform depends on the market(s) they operate
in. Bold text indicates an example market that has the relevant characteristics.
We model the online platform environment as a network that connects sellers with buyers
who could potentially demand goods from them. We characterise the equilibrium price setting
behaviour of sellers competing for consumer segments (i.e. groups of consumers who share
some characteristic like age or location) in a potentially large-scale stochastic network. The
network is stochastic in the sense that we assume that there is some probability of a given
buyer observing a given seller and that the actual network is only realised after price setting
has taken place.
We examine both the case in which the observation network is randomly determined by
nature, which we call decentralised search and the case where the network is determined by
the platform owner directly. In both cases, the observation network generates a competition
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network with links between sellers that measure the extent to which two sellers compete with
one another for consumers, which in turn determines equilibrium prices.
More specically, we nd that a seller's price is linked to their Bonacich centrality in a
network connecting sellers and consumer segments who observe them with some probability.
This result is consistent with the literature on strategic interaction in networks (e.g. Ballester,
Calvò-Armengol and Zenou, 2006), as well as more recent work applying price or quantity com-
petition to network environment (see, for example, Elliott and Galleotti, 2019). When sellers
are symmetric in terms of the substitutability of their goods and their own-price elasticity, we
nd that a seller's price is falling in their centrality.
Our nding that prices are decreasing in seller centrality in turn determine the prot
maximising network structure from the platform's perspective. The notion of a seller being
highly prominent corresponds precisely with them being more central in the network, and a
node being more central than average has a disproportionate impact on the centrality of other
nodes. Sellers in direct competition with the prominent seller, which drives a fall in prices,
which then produces a feedback eect: sellers in competition with sellers with lower prices
must decrease their price in order to compete eectively, as prices are strategic complements
(Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985).
The remainder of the results described above stem from this feedback eect inherent within
the equilibrium action of each seller. Search environments that reduce the probability that one
seller is particularly prominent increase aggregate prots. When a seller has higher quality,
the increases the probability that they are observed by increasing the number of total sellers
buyers observe, but doing so increases competition, which implies that the platform owner has
an incentive to reduce the number of sellers that are observed.
Our analysis more generally indicates that monopoly platforms have an incentive to lower
competition on the platform by changing its structure. Given that the optimal structure from a
consumer surplus perspective is one in which each buyer observes each seller with a probability
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of one, the fact that platforms may choose to only allow consumers to observe a fraction of the
total number of goods on oer is harmful to welfare. This suggests that competition author-
ities should examine intra-platform competition, in addition to inter-platform competition.
Regulating the internal structure of the networks that underpin large online platforms may
reduce the extent to which consumers are harmed by the formation of monopolistic platforms.
2 Literature review
In general, the literature that models buyer-seller interactions in a network setting has focused
on cases where buyers bargain with sellers they are connected to (Kranton and Minehart, 2001,
Corominas-Bosch, 2004 and Polanski, 2007) over a single, indivisible good. This approach
seems particularly relevant in relatively thin markets, populated by a small amount of buyers
and sellers, and where the goods being sold are discrete. In thin networks with discrete goods,
individual buyers and sellers can make bilateral agreements with one another easily.
However, many real-world cases of networks connecting buyers and sellers are not thin
markets. For example, online platforms, such as Amazon and Airbnb have a very large number
of users, with sellers interacting with a large number of buyers at any one time. This would
make bilateral bargaining between users dicult, and in general prices on these platforms are
not bilaterally negotiated or set by the owner of the platform itself. A natural assumption in
a thick market is that sellers choose a single price which is the same for each potential buyer.
Our starting framework is therefore more akin to the networks literature spawned by Ballester,
Calvò-Armengol and Zenou (2006), and developed in a IO setting in work such as Elliott and
Galleotti (2019) and Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkiliç (2018).
In terms of equilibrium characterisation, our nding that a seller's price in equilibrium is
decreasing in their Bonacich centrality in a seller-only network is consistent with Ballester,
Calvò-Armengol and Zenou (2006), which nds that if direct eects are suciently small,
the equilibrium action of each player in a network is proportional to their Bonacich centrality.
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The price setting behaviour of sellers are strategic complements in this setting, which might
suggest, as in Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours (2014), that the more central a seller in the
network, the higher their price.
Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkiliç (2018) examine networked quantity competition. Firms com-
pete for multiple markets, and each rm has a non-separable cost function, such that the
quantity produced in one market aects the marginal cost of production in another. In this
setting, it can be shown that quantities in that model are proportional to their Bonacich
centrality with a negative decay factor.
Elliott and Galeotti (2019) show that in a Hotelling environment in which sellers compete
on price and are dierentiated by location, a seller j's price is determined not only by the
sellers with whom directly j competes, but also those sellers in other markets that compete
with j's competitors. This result is a corollary of our more general characterisation of the
price equilibrium of the sellers on the platform.
The link we nd between pricing and centrality is consistent with earlier work in industrial
organisation, which examines the role captive buyers have on optimal pricing. Ireland (1993)
and McAfee (1994) consider a framework in which sellers of a homogeneous good compete for
consumers and have independent reach - the fact that a consumer observes a rm does not
aect the probability that the consumer observes another rm. The unique mixed equilibrium
of this game is one in which the lowest price within each seller's strategy set is the same, but
the strategy of the seller with the largest proportion of captive consumers contains the highest
maximum price. De Francesco and Salvadori (2013) and Armstrong and Vickers (2019) extend
this analysis to cases where rms have dierent capacities and only the largest rm has captive
customers respectively.
Our results in seller prominence in the decentralised search setting dier from earlier work
on prominence such as Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), which examines the case where
consumers engage in costly search to learn the price and match value of a series of products.
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If one product is more prominent than another, then it is observed rst, with buyers choosing
whether to buy it or search for other products. They nd that the prominent rm sets a lower
price than other sellers, who set a higher price than in the case where matching is random,
increasing prots. In contrast, our analysis nds that prominence causes prices to fall, because
prominence increases the expected intensity of competition, which has a disproportionately
large eect on prices.
By choosing the probability that dierent networks are realised, the platform owner has
the ability to intervene in order to inuence the actions of the sellers. There is a growing
literature on intervention in networks, though much of this literature does not consider the
question of network design directly.
An early example of a central planner intervening in a network on which players interact is
Ballester, Calvò-Armengol and Zenou (2006), which uses their characterisation of equilibrium
to identify the key player in the network, the removal of whom would allow a central planner
to reduce total activity the most with the removal of a single player.
Birge, Candogan and Chen (2018) construct a model in which rms are connected to
buyers on a network controlled by a platform and choose their price in order to attract buyers
with dierent valuations of a single good. They characterise the eect of network structure on
the protability of commissions and subscriptions from a platform's perspective, nding that
revenue loss is potentially unbounded when all sellers are charged either a common commission
or the same subscription fee regardless of their location in the network.
In an industrial organisation setting, Cominetti, Correa and Stier-Moses (2009) and Chawla
and Roughgarden (2009) compare the eciency of competitive equilibria of a game involving
Bertrand competition between rms who act as intermediaries who control the ow of some
good (for example) by controlling the edges of a network compared with the optimally ecient
network ow.
Galeotti, Golub and Goyal (2019) examine a case where a central planner can partly
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determine (at an exogenously imposed cost) the payo of players in a network, which in turn
determines the equilibrium actions of each player. While there is similarity between this
approach and the one utilised here, our intervention in the network is on its design, rather
than on the payo functions of the agents. Furthermore, the cost of intervention in our model
arises endogenously from the eect that changing observation probabilities has on increasing
competition.
Li (2019) examines the case where a central planner chooses the design of a directed
graph on which agents experience local strategic complements. In this context, and with
no constraints on the strength of links, they nd that all optimal networks are generalized
nested split graphs as this maximises the sum of centralities via the feedback eect inherent
in this set-up. Our setting involves a bipartite network in which the sellers are linked by their
connections with non-active agents, which generates a natural constraint on the direction of
links in the network, and actions are decreasing in centrality, leading to the optimal graph (at
least in the symmetric case) being one in which centralities are equal, reducing the feedback
eect.
Charlson (2020) uses an initial set-up similar to the one here to examine the case where
the platform owner suers from incomplete information, and must design the network without
knowing the quality of the sellers on the platform. The platform owner utilises ratings as a
way of biasing search results towards high-quality sellers, but in doing so decreases prices in
expectation because increasing the prominence of high-quality sellers drives down prices due to
an increase in total centrality. As a result of this trade-o, some platforms may prefer random
matching to using ratings as a way of biasing search results, to the detriment of consumers.
More broadly, we contribute to the wider literature on competition and platforms. Tra-
ditional accounts of platform industrial organisation have focused on competition between
platforms (Tirole and Rochet, 2003, Armstrong, 2006 and Tan and Zhou, 2019), our model re-
gards intra-platform competition. There is less analysis in economics relating to intra-platform
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competition and platform design, with most of the work on the latter relating to information
design on platforms (Armstrong and Zhou, 2020 and Elliott and Galleoti, 2020), rather than
network design specically. Within network competition has been examined in a management
context (Zhu and Liu, 2018 and Nambisan and Baron, 2019), but these analyses relate to
seller development and platform-seller conict, rather than how platforms shape buyer-seller
interactions.
3 Motivating example
Large, online platform owners must design platforms in which many sellers compete for many
buyers. If sellers can only set one price, then network design has implications for the nature of
competition between sellers for dierent buyers. If a platform owner can aect which buyers
observe which sellers and sellers only set one price, then the platform owner faces a trade-
o between more sellers being observed, increasing demand, and the resultant increase in
competition.
As an example, suppose the probability that two buyers observe two sellers is strictly
between 0 and 1. Then all the possible ex-post market structures (ignoring the case where no
buyer observes any sellers) are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The black nodes represent sellers, the white nodes represent buyers. Assuming
sellers and buyers are identical, these congurations represent all possible market types when
there are two sellers and two buyers.
Consider the nature of total prots and competition if prices were set after the realisation
of a network structure. Market structures on the bottom and to the right of the diagram
exhibit less competition, but prots are lost because the buyers will be assumed throughout
to purchase at least some goods from any seller they observe. This issue is reduced in market
structures above and to the left of the diagram; however, there, the two sellers are in more
direct competition with one another, which reduces prot due to both sellers setting a lower
price.
The trade-o highlighted by this simple example is one that the platform owner faces
when designing the network. The framework examined here involves a platform owner that
chooses the probability that each possible network between a xed number buyers and sellers
is realised. We identify the extent to which changing these probabilities aects competition
and prices, and characterise the prot-maximising probability vector.
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4 Model
Sellers, buyers and the platform owner
Suppose there is a nite set, B, whose elements are consumer segments, in the sense that
they are a nite mass of consumers who are assumed to share some trait, such as geographical
location, age demographic, occupation, etc. We use n to denote the number of consumer
segments.
Similarly, let S be a nite set of sellers, where |S| = m. Sellers each sell a single type
of completely divisible good, and each seller's good is an imperfect substitute for each of the
goods.
Sellers and buyers interact on a platform, with each buyer observing a subset of S. These
observations generate a network Gi = (B ∪ S). We assume that the graph generating process
is stochastic in the sense that there is a probability θi ∈ [0, 1] that a graph Gi is generated for
every possible m − n bipartite graph, and hence
∑
i θi = 1. Let θ denote a vector whose ith
entry is θi.
Consider a simple example of the above set-up, with three sellers (X,Y and Z) and three
consumer segments (1, 2 and 3). Suppose there are two graphs which can be realised with some
positive probability are: (1) the complete graph, in which each buyer observes each seller and;
(2) the graph depicted on the right of Figure 3, in which sellers Y and Z compete for consumer
segment 2 but the other two segments are captive. Assume both of these graphs are realised
with equal probability.
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Figure 3: A case where two graphs can be realised.
Let p denote a m×1 vector whose jth entry is pj ∈ R+, the price of j's good. We assume that
sellers set prices prior to the realisation of the links in the network, but with full knowledge
of the vector θ. We will assume that if a consumer segment i observes a seller j, then their
demand function, xij(.) : Rm → R+, for product j can be expressed as follows:1:




where a, γj , c are all strictly positive scalars. The parameter γj can be thought of as a
measure of the quality of the seller j. We will assume throughout that a is large enough such
that xij > 0 for each observed good: this restriction will be discussed in more detail below.
As cik > 0 for all i, k 6= i, each product is a gross substitute for every other product.
Note that the demand function above is an ex-post demand function, in that it is generated
after the realisation of the network structure is realised, and hence after the sellers set prices.




θτµij(Gτ )(aγj − apj +
m∑
k=1
µik(Gτ )cjk(pk − γk)),
where µij(Gτ ) is a function such that if Eij ∈ Gτ and 0 otherwise. Seller j's expected aggregate
demand function is then dened:
1We show that this assumption is an approximation of the linear demand curve that is generated from a






A seller, j, is assumed not to be able to price discriminate across buyers, and hence sets a
single price pj ∈ R+. Sellers compete with one another on price, and set prices simultaneously.
Therefore, each seller's maximisation problem can be expressed:
max
pj
E[πj(pj , p_j ; θ)].
Let Γ(θ) represent the simultaneous move m-player game played on a network G with payos
as specied above and strategy spaces R+.
The platform owner has the following prot function:




where 0 < χ < 1.
The search environment
We will consider two search environments:
1. The decentralised search environment, in which a consumer segment, i, observes a
seller j with probability 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1. The observation probabilities are themselves
stochastically determined in the following sense. Each wij is the realisation of a random
variable w̃ij according to the symmetric probability distribution, Λ, which is bounded
such that 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 and has mean υ. The random variables w̃ij are independently
and identically distributed
2. The centralised search environment, in which the platform owner chooses the proba-
bility vector θ, optimising their above prot function.
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In the decentralised case, nature determines the observation probabilities. This in turn gen-
erates the probability vector θ. In the centralised case, the platform owner chooses this
probability vector directly in order to solve the following maximisation problem:
maxθE[πP (p;θ)]
which we will assume is subject to the constraint that θi ∈ [0, 1],
∑






θτ [µij(Gτ )] > 0 ∀j.
We therefore assume that each seller is observed by at least one buyer with a strictly positive
probability. This assumption ensures that the centrality of each seller in the network is de-
ned for any proposed solution to the above maximisation problem, and seems conceptually
legitimate as we do not explicitly model the entry decision either from the seller or platform
side.
In both search cases, θ is common knowledge, and prices are hence set after the realisation
of θ, but, as stated previously, prior to the realisation of the actual observation network.
5 Equilibrium characterisation
We characterise the equilibrium price setting behaviour for a given vector of graph probabilities


















Thus, αj(θ) represents the expected value of the intercept of the aggregate demand function
of j, and βj represents the expected aggregate price sensitivity. It is thus possible to write the
prot function above as follows:










k µik(Gτ )cik), which is therefore a measure of the strength of the
connection between j and k because it measures the weighted link between the sellers and





















. The maximisation problem maxpi π̃i(p;θ) has
the same set of rst-order conditions as the one that involves maximising a vector containing
the prot functions in (1). This transformation yields a competition network, GS(θ), which
is a projection of G(θ), where the edge between sellers j and k has the weight c̃jk. The
competition network of the probability vector θ that generates the two graphs in Figure 3
with equal probability is shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Transforming the network G into the competition network GS . Here it is assumed
that b = 1 and c = 0.25 for each buyer and γj = 1 for all j.
Dene RS(θ) as a symmetric zero diagonal matrix of a network GS(θ) with elements c̃ij(θ).
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Let α̃(θ) represent a m × 1 vector with element j α̃j . To ensure that an equilibrium of the
game is unique, it is necessary to ensure that demand is positive for all sellers.
Let γl denote the smallest element of the vector γ. Throughout, we make the following
assumption:





Dene Cα̃(θ) = [I − RS(θ)]−1α̃(θ), which is the weighted transformed Bonacich centrality
measure of the network GS . The following Proposition, which characterises the equilibrium
price vector, then holds:
Proposition 1. If (A1) holds, then the game Γ(θ) has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, which is the equilibrium price vector:
p∗(θ) = Cα̃(θ).
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium price vector that is equal to the Bonacich centrality
of the sellers in the network GS(θ) multiplied by α̃(θ).
The assumption (A1) provides a restriction on each c̃ij , which is measures the substi-
tutability of the model, relative to the eect own price has on demand, which is captured
by a. Specically, (A1) guarantees both that (a): xij(θ) > 0 for all i, j pairs and (b) that
L = I − λRS(θ) is strictly diagonally dominant for all θ, which implies that L is also positive
denite. Jointly, these two facts guarantee that the Nash equilibrium of the game both exists
and is unique for any graph structure.
Dene γ as an m×1 vector with jth element γj . Proposition 1 implies the following result:
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Corollary 1. The unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ(θ) is:
p∗(θ) = γ − 1
2
C(θ)γ.
Hence, a seller's equilibrium price is decreasing in their centrality in GS(θ). Sellers who
are connected to more isolated consumer segments (particularly those who are captive) face
relatively less competition than sellers who are largely connected to segments with dierent
goods to choose from, and therefore are able to set a higher price in equilibrium than other
sellers. The above expression implies seller j's price is increasing in γj but is decreasing in
every other element of the vector γ.
Returning to the example in Figures 3 and 4, Proposition 1 suggests that the centrality of





Seller Z has a uniquely connected segment with probability 0.5 and therefore has lower cen-
trality in the competition network than X or Y. As a result, Z's price is higher than either X
or Y's. Y's price is the centrality is the highest because they compete with both X and Z in
the graph where every consumers does not observe every seller.
6 Decentralised search
The preceding analysis shows that the platform owner faces a trade-o between increasing
sales on the one hand and reducing competition on the other. We now examine the prot
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maximising graph structure, taking that minimises the level of competition for a given level
of expected sales.
The observation probabilities can be thought of as a measure of prominence in the sense
that they capture the likelihood that the seller is observed by a given buyer. Seller j's promi-
nence in the network potentially increases prots as a result of increasing the probability
of sales, but at the same time it imposes a cost on the rest of the network by increasing
competition, reducing prices of every seller, including for the more prominent seller.
As the number of sellers and the centrality of those sellers in the network GS increases,
increasing wij has an increasingly large eect on prices. To see this, note that the centrality





It follows that ∂
2Ck(θ)
∂2wij
> 0. Recall that prices are falling in the centrality of the sellers in this
setting. Hence, increasing wij imposes a cost upon the platform owner because the centrality
measure has a feedback eect such that increasing an observation probability wij (weakly)
reduces j's price, which reduces every other seller's price, which then reduces j's price and so
on. This feedback eect, which is a feature of the Bonacich centrality measure, is increasing
as the centralities of the sellers in GS become larger.
The preceding analysis implies the following result. Suppose w̃ij ∼ Λ1 and let Λ2 be a
mean-preserving spread of Λ1 such that when w̃
′
ij ∼ Λ2 constructed in the following way:
w̃
′
ij = w̃ij + εij
where εij is symmetrically distributed and has mean 0, and is bounded such 0 ≤ w̃
′
ij ≤ 1. Let
θ̃k denote the random probability vector generated by the distribution Λk. Then the following
result holds:
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Theorem 1. Suppose γj = γ ∀j and c > 0. Then, E[pj(θ̃1)] > E[pj(θ̃2)] and E[πP (θ̃1)] >
E[πP (θ̃2)].




j w̃ij ]) is the same for both probability distri-
butions. Hence, any dierences in expected prot between the two are the result of dierences
in the expected price level.
As the quality vector γ is independent of centrality in this case, the expected price level
can be denoted:
E[p∗(θ̃)] = γ − 1
2
E[C(θ̃)]γ.
Suppose that w̃ij ∼ Λ1 and w̃
′
ij ∼ Λ2. Recalling that
∂2Ck
∂2wij
> 0 and that the w̃ijs are
independent of one another, then it must be the case that:
E[Cj(θ̃2)] > E[Cj(θ̃1)] ∀j.
Prot is increasing and concave in price if p∗j ∈ [0, 12γ], which is true for any realisation of
θ. The above inequality implies that expected prices are lower in the case where each w̃ij is
distributed according to the mean preserving contraction θ̃2. Intuitively, this result is driven by
the fact that high realisations of an observation probability w̃ij result in a disproportionately
low price compared to low realisations of w̃ij .
Furthermore, as observation probabilities are independent of each other, if they have a
distribution of θ̃2 it results in a higher probability that two or more sellers are prominent for
a large number (or all) of the consumer segments. We refer the case where there is relatively
intense competition between a subset of the sellers on the network as one in which competition
is concentrated. There being a-higher-than-average probability that two sellers compete with
one another drives their own prices down, which propagates across the network. The eect of
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concentrated competition is depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The prominence of X and Y results in concentrated competition between the two
sellers.
Let ΛD(υ) denote the degenerate distribution where wij = υ < 1 for each i, j with probability
1. Theorem 1 implies the following result:
Proposition 2. For any symmetric, continuous distribution Λ 6= ΛD(υ) with mean υ and
corresponding probability vector, θ̃, E[πP (θD)] > E[πP (θ̃)].
From the platform owner's perspective, ΛD(υ) is the optimal probability distribution of all
symmetric, continuous distributions with mean υ. Such a probability distribution yields a
bipartite, Erdos-Renyi graph with nodes m,n and link probability υ.
However, the corresponding probability vector, θD, generated in the case where each ob-
servation probability is equal to υ results in there being some positive probability of states
in which each segment observes a large proportion of or all of the sellers in the network. For
example, the complete network is realised with probability vmn > 0 when the probability
vector is θD.
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A positive probability of the realisation of high-competition states are costly to the platform
because they increase the sum of the edges emanating from most if not all sellers. As a result,
these states have a relatively large eect on the centrality of each seller in the competition
graph GS . It follows that the platform owner would prefer to avoid placing any probability of
the realisation of such outcomes.
7 The centralised search environment
Consumer surplus
We rst characterise the networks that maximise consumer surplus. Dene the expected
consumer surplus of consumer segment i for a given equilibrium price vector p∗ and demand


























∗), where x∗ is an m × n matrix whose ijth component is
x∗ij(p
∗). As I−λRS is diagonally dominant by (A1), it is clear from the above expression that
the expected value of each CSi(x
∗
i ;p
∗) is falling in p∗. It is also straightforward to show that
expected consumer surplus, ceteris paribus, is increasing in the expected number of connections
in G a buyer has. Clearly then, CS is a function of θ and can be written CS(θ). Dene Gc
as the complete graph, in which each consumer segment observes each seller. Let θc denote
the probability vector in which the complete graph Gc is yielded with probability θc = 1. The
following proposition holds:
Proposition 3. For any probability vector θ 6= θc, E[CS(θc)] > E[CS(θ)].
The centrality of each agent is at its maximum for a given number of buyers and sellers when
the network is complete. Intuitively, when the network is complete, each buyer is competed
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for by each seller. A complete network maximises competition, which reduces the equilibrium
price level of each seller. This result is consistent with Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkiliç (2018),
who nd that a complete network maximises consumer welfare in Cournot setting if buyers'
demand functions are homogeneous.2
Hence, despite the fact that in a Cournot model the sellers' actions are strategic substitutes,
while in a Bertrand setting they are strategic complements, the driving logic in both cases is
that competition reduces prices and a complete network maximises competition.
Prot maximising graphs and hidden products
Consider rst the case where c = 0. If c is zero, then that each seller's product is not
a substitute for the other goods in the market, which implies that each interaction eect
parameter linking the two sellers in GS is equal to zero for any θ. The following Proposition
then holds:
Proposition 4. Suppose c = 0. For any probability vector θ 6= θc, E[πP (θc)] > E[πP (θ)].
When goods are non-substitutable, sellers are not in competition with one another. Prices
are therefore set at the monopoly level. The platform owner then always has an incentive to
increase the probability that the complete network is realised, as such a network is always
more protable than any graph in which at least one segment does not observe at least one
seller. It follows that the complete network maximises seller prot, which in turn maximises
the platform owner's prot.
However, despite the assumption here that demand from each consumer segment is strictly
2 Strictly, the model of Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkiliç (2018) is one where rms compete for markets rather
than consumers. They nd that if markets are of the same size, which would be equivalent to homogeneous
buyers in this model.
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positive for any good they observe, the complete network does not necessarily maximise the
platform's prot. The platform owner has an incentive to reduce the probability that sellers
are observed in order to increase prices. In decreasing observation probabilities, the platform
owner potentially (assuming a is suciently large) reduces demand. In order to maximise
prot then, the platform owner must choose a network structure that maximises the expected
number of sellers each consumer segment observes while accounting for the constraint that
increasing observability decreases prices.
Proposition 5 formalises the above intuition:
Proposition 5. For all γ, there exists a c̄ ∈ R+ such that if c > c̄ then in any solution to the
platform owner's maximisation problem, θ∗, θ∗c < 1.
Proposition 5 highlights the platform owner's trade-o with respect to network design. Increas-
ing the probability that each of the seller's is observed increases prots as sales are increasing
in the probability that each buyer observes each seller. At the same time, increasing sales in-
creases competition, reducing prices. If goods are suciently substitutable, then the platform
owner is willing to forgo some potential sales in order to increase prices.
Prot-maximing graphs with no vertical dierentiation
Supposem ≥ 2 and γj = γ for all j. We consider a probability vector θ generates a competition
graph in which Ci(θ) > Cj(θ) for at least one i, j pair and show that such a probability vector
can never be a solution to the platform owner's maximisation problem.
We consider the following reallocation of probabilities. Let Cj(θ) be (jointly one of) the
smallest component(s) of the vectorC(θ)1m. Take a graphG which is realised with probability
θG > 0 when the probability vector is θ. Dene Gjk as a graph which is the result of performing
a neighbourhood switch between two sellers j and k in G, such that for any i where Eij ∈ G
and Eik /∈ G, Eij /∈ Gjk and vice versa. Such a switch is depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: A neighbourhood switch between sellers X and Y.
Dene a vector θjk where the probability that the graph Gjk is realised is equal to θG, the
probability that the graph G was realised in the probability vector θ. Now dene another
probability vector, θ̂j , as follows:




where ε ∈ R+ is arbitrarily small.
We show that πP (θ̂j) > πP (θ) when Cj(θ) > Ck(θ). To see this, we consider the eect
of a single neighbourhood switch between j and k where Ck(θ) > Cj(θ), holding the prices of
sellers other than j and k constant.
Such a switch between j and k results in an increase in k's centrality and a decrease in
j. However, as a result of the fact that c̃ij is convex in βi for all j 6= i and because Ci(θ) is
convex in c̃ij , the decrease in j's centrality must be larger than the increase in k's centrality.
This in turn implies that k's price falls less than j's price increases.
As a result of the additional fact that prots are increasing and concave in prices below the
monopoly price (which is implied by (A1)), it follows that the proposed switch will result in
an increase in the total prots the platform receives from j and k. The same logic applies for
any seller Cl(θ) > Cj(θ) and if Cl(θ) = Cj(θ), then the proposed reallocation has no direct
eect on prices.
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Now, consider the additional second-order eect of prices changing as a result of each
neighbourhood switch. A change in j and k centrality aects the centrality of every other
seller in the network, which also aects prices and demand. Recall that the centrality of a
seller i in GS , as per Bonacich (1972), can be written as follows:




As the centrality of j is (weakly) less than every other seller, and the decrease in the centrality
of k associated with a neighbourhood switch with j is (again, weakly) larger than the increase
in j's centrality implies that the spillover eects associated a change from θ to θ̂j are prot
increasing. Hence, the second-order eect of the proposed set of neighbourhood switches is
positive. Theorem 2 summarises these results:
Theorem 2. Suppose γj = γ for all j and m ≥ 2. Any solution, θ∗, to the platform owner's
maximisation problem, induces a seller-only graph GS(θ




The optimal seller-only graph structure is one in which each seller is as central as every other
seller. If this is not the case, then the platform owner can always nd a marginal re-allocation
that increases the expected number of consumer segments observing the higher priced seller
and increases prices across the network.
Theorem 2 does not fully characterise the optimal solution to the platform owner's problem.
Instead, it provides a condition under which a graph GS is the result of the platform owner's
maximisation problem. However, it is possible to use the result in Theorem 2 to map the
optimal set of competition graphs onto a. Again noting that Ci(θ) = 1 +
∑
i 6=j c̃ijCj(θ) the
Theorem implies the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Suppose γj = γ for all j. Any solution, θ
∗, to the platform owner's maximisation
problem, induces a seller-only graph GS(θ
∗) such that
∑
i 6=j c̃ij = c̃ ∈ R+.
For any solution to the platform owner's optimisation problem, it must be that the sum of the
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links a seller i has to every other seller must be equal to the same sum for another seller j. If
this does not hold, it cannot be that the centralities of the sellers are equal.
Dene σiy(G) as the number of buyers for which seller i faces competition from exactly
y ∈ {0, 1...,m− 1} sellers in the graph G. Then we can write
∑











Recall that βi is the expected number of consumer segments that observe i. Hence,
∑
i 6=j c̃ij(θ)
is equal to the expected average number of competitors i faces. Corollary 2 therefore implies
that in any solution to the platform owner's maximisation problem, the average number of
competitors each seller faces when active (i.e. when they are observed by at least one consumer
segment) is the same for each seller.
Let ϕi(G) denote the number of sellers consumer segment i observes in the graph G.
Corollary 2 also pins down the average number of sellers buyers observe in the optimal solution,
which is simply ac c̃(θ
∗) + 1 := ϕ̂(θ∗). We can show that each consumer segment's number
of observations should be centered closely around this average in any optimal solution, as
Theorem 3 makes clear:
Theorem 3. Suppose γj = γ for all j. For any solution to the platform owner's problem, θ
∗,
it must be the case that if θ∗G > 0 for some graph G then ϕi(G) = bϕ̂(θ∗)c or ϕi(G) = dϕ̂(θ∗)e
for all i.
A network G in which a consumer segment i observes ϕ̂(θ∗) + k (where k > 1) sellers has
a disproportionately negative eect on prots compared with the otherwise identical network
G
′
in which i observes ϕ̂(θ∗)−k sellers. The reason for this is that in G each of the ϕ̂(θ∗) +k
sellers competes with ϕ̂(θ∗) + k − 1 other sellers. Hence, the sum of links generated by i's
observation in any network is convex in the number of sellers observed.
The above analysis suggests that a graph (or weighted average of two graphs) in which i
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observes the average number of sellers is more protable than a weighted mix of graphs G and
G
′
. In the proof of Theorem 3, we show that in the case where there is probability of graphs
such as G and G
′
being generated, it is always possible to nd a reallocation of probabilities
such that (a) consumer segment i (and every other consumer segment) observes the same
number of sellers in expectation and (b) prices increase.
Note that Theorems 2 and 3 do not show there is generally a unique vector θ∗ that solves
the platform owner's maximisation problem. As consumer preferences and sellers are identical
in this set up, for any solution, θ∗1, where θ
∗
c 6= 1, there exists a vector, θ∗2, where the expected
number of sellers segments observe is the same, and prices are the same as in θ∗1. This implies
that πP (θ
∗
1) = πP (θ
∗
2).
However, we can show that while generally there is not a unique solution to the plat-
form owner's problem, the following Proposition implies that there is a unique price vector
associated with any solution to the platform owner's problem:





owner's maximisation problem, it must be the case that p∗(θ∗1) = p
∗(θ∗2).
We show in the proof of Proposition 6 that when preferences and seller prices are identical,
the platform owner's maximisation problem amounts to choosing the overall expected number
of sellers observed by consumer segments. We show that there is a unique solution to this
problem, which in turn implies that the price vector for any solution to the original prot
maximisation problem must generate the same price vector as another solution to that problem.
The previous discussion implies that in any optimal solution to the platform owner's prob-
lem θ∗:
 Seller prices are all equal to some price p∗;
 sellers either face bϕ̂(θ∗)c−1 or dϕ̂(θ∗)e−1 competitors for any graph G where θ∗G > 0;
 the probability that j encounters dϕ̂(θ∗)e − 1 competitors is the same for all j.
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The platform owner maximises aggregate prot by ensuring that segments observe a xed
number of sellers that is tightly constrained around a mean determined by innate demand for
the sellers' good and how substitutable those goods are.
8 Vertical dierentiation
In the previous section, we considered the case in which goods are horizontally dierentiated,
but are of the same quality. We now consider the case where products may dier in quality,
which in the model corresponds to the case where γj > γk for at least one pair of sellers j and
k.
To illustrate the eect of vertical dierentiation on optimal network design, we rst examine
the case where the platform owner sets an optimal graph structure θ∗ and there is a marginal
increase in the quality of a single good j. Let γ denote a m×1 vector of seller qualities. Then
the following Proposition holds:





≥ 0 with the inequality strict if θ∗ 6= θc; (ii) ∂βi(θ
∗;γ)
∂γj
≤ 0 ∀i 6= j; and (iii)
∂ϕ̂(θ∗;γ)
∂γj
≤ 0 with the inequality strict if θ∗ 6= θc.
If the quality of j's product increases, then the platform owner has an incentive to increase
the probability that j is observed, assuming that j is not observed with probability 1. This is
because j's demand is increasing in γj for a given p(θ
∗).
At the same time, an increase in γj leads to a reduction in the demand for the products of
sellers directly competing with j. Hence, if a seller i competes with j in a graph realised with
positive probability in the vector θ∗, then the platform owner has an incentive to reduce the
probability that i is observed in order to reduce the interaction between i and j. Reducing the
total probability that i is observed has the eect of increasing i's price and demand, increasing
prots.
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The fact that i's demand is falling in γj implies the platform owner has an incentive to
reduce the total number of sellers who compete with j. As the probability that j is observed
increases, this implies that the expected number of sellers that consumer segments observe
decreases in the case where θ∗ 6= θc. When θ∗ = θc, then it is possible that substitutability
is suciently low such that the complete network being realised with probability 1 is still
optimal even with the increase in γj .
We show an example of the eect of an increase in γj in Figure 7.
Figure 7: As γX increases, the platform owner increases the probability that the graph on
the right-hand side is realised increases and reduces the probability that the graph on the
left-hand side is realised decreases.
Now, consider the more general case where each γj can dier from one another. To generate a
distribution of quality vectors, suppose that each γ̃j ∼ Φ, where Φ is a symmetric and bounded
probability distribution, such that the realisation of γ̃j 's value, γj > 0 and E[γ̃j ] = γ̄ for all j.
Suppose that the platform owner sets the vector θ after the realisation of γ.
Let γ̃ denote the random quality vector associated with the case where each γ̃j ∼ Φi.
Suppose that if γ̃j ∼ Φ1 it is bounded such that γ̃j ∼ [γL, γH ]. Now dene Φ2 such that when
γ̃j ∼ Φ2, γ̃j can be decomposed in the following way:
γ̃j = γ̃
′
j + εj ,
where γ̃
′
j ∼ Φ1 and εj is distributed symmetrically with mean 0 and is bounded such that
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εj ∼ [εL, εH ]. We examine the ex-ante (i.e prior to the realisation of γ̃) prots and expected
number of sellers observed by each segment when qualities are have a distribution of Φi in the
following theorem:
Theorem 4. i) For any value of c, E[πP (θ
∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ2] ≥ E[πP (θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ1] and ii) ∃cT ∈
R+such that if c ≤ cT , E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ1] ≥ E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ2] and if c > cT , E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ2] >
E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ1].
To illustrate the results in Theorem 4, we consider a more limited case where under Φ1 each
γ̃j = γ̄ with probability 1. Consider rst the claim relating to prot. If c is suciently small
(e.g. equal to zero), then in expectation the optimal probability vector for either distribution
will be such that θ∗c = 1. In this case, expected prot is the same under both distributions.
However, in the case where the platform owner restricts the number of sellers consumers
observe, they are able to bias consumer observation towards high-quality products. In the case
where Φ1 results in each seller having the same quality with probability 1, this is clearly not
possible, whereas the mean-preserving spread Φ2 generates some high-quality and low-quality
players in expectation. Thus, when c is suciently high, E[πP (θ
∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ2] > E[πP (θ∗)|γ̃ ∼ Φ1]
due to consumers being more likely to observe high-quality sellers. We depict this result in
Figure 8.
Figure 8: The expected prot when γ̃ ∼ Φ2 is weakly larger than γ̃ ∼ Φ1 for all c. E[πi,H ]
is the expected prot associated with the seller with the highest quality being a monopolist
when the distribution is Φi.
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Now consider the second result in Theorem 4. As c increases, the number of sellers observed by
consumers reduces for either distribution of qualities. However, the expected loss of a segment
observing fewer sellers to platform prot is increasing more slowly in the case where is no
vertical dierentiation. The reason for this is that as c becomes large, the expected quality of
a seller that the platform owner is marginally willing to exclude in the case where quality is
dispersed becomes greater than the mean quality level, γ̄.
The platform owner is less willing to exclude such high-quality sellers from being observed.
Hence, when c is suciently large, the optimal number of sellers a segment observes is, in
expectation, greater for the vertically dierentiated case compared to the case where product
quality is the same. This is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Dark blue line denotes the case where γ̃ ∼ Φ2, light blue where γ̃ ∼ Φ1.
9 Discussion
When a platform owner's revenue is a proportion of the prots of sellers on their platform, they
have an incentive to reduce the probability that buyers observe sellers. While ensuring that a
consumer segment observes a seller increases sales, it produces a cost because it reduces prices
through increased competition. If product substitutability is suciently high, the platform
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owner reduces observability to maintain high prices, reducing consumer welfare.
The result that platform owners have an incentive to reduce the number of sellers observed
by consumers is consistent with the observed behaviour of online platforms. A number of
empirical studies (Ringer and Skiera, 2016 and Kim, Albuquerque and Bronnenberg, 2010)
highlight that consumers on online platforms only observe a small subset of the total products
on oer. Anecdotal evidence suggests that searching for products with a large number of
results on platforms like Amazon.com does not return the entirety of the products relevant to
that search.3
Our results explain some other observed behaviour of real-world platforms. Almost all large
platforms that link buyer-sellers use a search environment that displays a consistent number
of results to each consumer segment. Theorem 3 explains the observed structure of the search
process on real-world platforms. Consumers, at least by default, observe a relatively small
number of sellers for any given search, with more results shown on pages they have to click
through to observe. Empirical evidence (Baye et al, 2009, Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001 and
Baye et al 2015) suggests that relatively few consumers click onto the second page of search
results, and as such constructing the search process in this way yields a competition structure
similar to the one predicted by Theorem 3.
Given dierences in technical ability and ability to process information online, it might
be expected that dierent segments were displayed a dierent numbers of sellers, something
that does not appear to happen on most platforms. Our results show that one reason why
platforms may show a consistent number of sellers to all consumer segments is that doing so
minimises the level of competition for a given number of consumer-seller links, maximising
prices.
Proposition 7 gives an account of the incentives platforms have in the case where there
is a high-quality product in the market. The platform owner has an incentive to increase
3For example, searching the words economics textbooks into Amazon generates 20 pages of results, far
fewer than the 60,000+ results that the platform claims to have available.
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the probability that this seller is observed, which is consistent with platforms highlighting
particular products. Perhaps less obviously, our model shows that highlighting such products
increases competition, and thus incentivises the platform owner to reduce the number of sellers
observed in expectation.
While platforms tend to be quite consistent in displaying a xed subset of sellers to con-
sumers, the number of sellers shown diers from platform to platform. Our analysis shows
that the extent to which high-quality products should be showcased, the number of results
displayed and the probability that a given seller is observed more generally depends on both
the substitutability of products on the platform and the variation in quality.
Our analysis allows us to characterise the optimal number of sellers displayed by dierent
types of platforms, as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: The optimal number of sellers on a platform depends on the market(s) they operate
in. Bold text indicates an example market that has the relevant characteristics.
The optimal number of sellers in the market depends on both substitutability and variance
in quality. As substitutability increases, the number of sellers in all markets reduce, but the
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reduction is less fast in the case where quality variance is high.
When substitutability is high, we nd that platforms where products are less dierentiated
by quality will display relatively fewer sellers, as not showing high-quality products at all times
loses less revenue than in markets where quality is highly dispersed. When substitutability
is low, more quality dispersion implies that higher quality products will be displayed more,
increasing the platform owner's incentive to reduce the probability that these products will be
observed.
Useful future empirical work would examine the extent to which real-world platforms act in
the manner predicted in the model. It would be particularly worthwhile analysing in detail the
extent to which platforms from dierent sectors highlight particular products and the number
of products displayed by the platform.
There are a few of potentially important issues left unaddressed by our analysis. We
have assumed that marginal costs are zero. If sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their
marginal cost, then the platform owner may have an incentive to increase the prominence
of low cost sellers in the network at the expense of sellers with higher marginal costs. This
would imply that some form of paid prominence could be prot maximising from the platform
owner's perspective, as Armstrong and Zhou (2011) point out.
More broadly, the framework here could be used to examine the eect of entry, exit and
mergers have in dierent parts of networked markets. For example, the Bonacich centrality
vector is informative of which sellers impose the most competition on the network. A regulator
or central wishing to maintain low prices would pay particular attention to such a player when
performing merger control or which rms to bail out during recessions.
10 Conclusion
We analyse the case where consumers only observe a subset of sellers on a platform, which can
be thought of as a bipartite observation network. The probability that an observation network
is realised is determined either by nature or by the owner of the platform. Prices are set prior
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to the realisation of the network, but the realisation probabilities are common knowledge.
We nd there is a unique, interior pure strategy equilibrium where each seller's price is
falling in their Bonacich centrality in a sellers-only network that is strategically equivalent to
the original bipartite network. The more central a player in this competition network, the
more competition they face, and the lower their price.
Using the characterisation of equilibrium, it is possible to see how changes in network
structure aect prices. In the decentralised search case, where observation probabilities are
independent and set by nature, we nd that a type of symmetric mean-preserving spread of
some distribution of observation probabilities decreases prots compared to the case where
probabilities are distributed according to the original distribution.
Due to the feedback eect inherent to actions determined by the sellers' Bonacich cen-
tralities in the network, a seller being more likely to be prominent results in an increase in
competition that is larger than the corresponding decrease in competition associated with
a reduction in prominence. Prominent sellers are more likely in the case where observation
probabilities are more dispersed, and such sellers disproportionately increase competition, de-
creasing prices.
At the same time, our analysis of the decentralised case draws attention to the dispro-
portionately large cost to platform prots associated with there being a positive probability
that high competition states, in which consumers observe most or all sellers, are realised.
This observation shapes the platform owner's incentives in the case where they can choose the
observation network.
Turning to the centralised search case, at a high level we nd that while consumer surplus is
maximised in the case where the complete network is realised with probability 1, the platform
owner has an incentive to hide products from consumers if substitutability is large enough.
We nd that in the case where there is no vertical dierentiation, the optimal seller graph
is one in which each seller has the same centrality. We show that this implies that in any
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prot-maximising observation probability vector, the expected number of sellers observed by
consumers is as close to the average number of sellers observed across all possible networks.
This minimises competition for a given number of expected buyer-seller links, increasing prof-
its.
When products are vertically dierentiated, the platform owner has an incentive to in-
crease the probability that sellers of higher quality are observed. This increases the eective
competition faced by other sellers in the network, which reduces prices. To reduce the signi-
cance of this eect, the platform owner has an incentive to reduce the total number of sellers
observed by consumers.
If seller quality is random, the platform owner prefers a mean-preserving spread of some
distribution of quality over the original distribution. The reason for this is that the platform
owner can generate more prot by biasing observation towards high-quality sellers. If products
are not that substitutable, then the platform hides more sellers when quality dispersion is high,
as doing so alleviates the competition eect discussed above. When product substitutability
is high, fewer products are visible in either case, and the platform is less willing to hide
the highest quality products when quality dispersion is high, leading to more products being
optimally observed in expectation.
As platforms have an incentive to reduce competition in order to increase prices, our
analysis suggests that competition authorities would be well-advised to take seriously attempts
by platforms to control intra-platform competition. Regulation, insofar as it has been directed
at online platforms, has tended to focus on competition between platforms. As online platforms
become more established and dominant, this kind of competition becomes less relevant, and
the incentives to increase prices by tweaking search algorithms or the use of private information
will become increasingly important.
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We show that the linear demand curve for the game Γ(θ) is a simplied form of the one
generated by the following demand system. Let yi denote i's demand for a numeraire good.














where κ, ρ ∈ R+. Suppose that each buyer has an income of l. Assuming l is suciently large
and a > ā, then demand for each product is positive. Dene the m×m matrix κ as follows:
κ =
1 ρ ... ρ
ρ





ρ . . . ρ 1
Then, as discussed in Amir, Erikson and Jin (2015), the demand vector xi can be written:
xi = κ
−1(γ − p).
Hence, for any consumer segment i and any seller j, the intercept term of the i's demand for
j's product is some constant, a, multiplied by γ and their own price sensitivity term is also
equal to a.
Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that assumption (A1) guarantees that: (a) α̃j(θ) > 0 ∀j and (b) [I − λRS(θ)] is











As βi > 0, it follows that αj(θ) > 0, which implies that α̃j(θ) > 0. As cγk > 0, then for a
given vector γ, and given values for the parameters c and a, αj(θ) is lowest when θ = θc,
where θc denotes the probability vector where θc = 1, where θc is the probability that the
complete bipartite graph Gc is realised. It is also clear that when θ = θc, αl(θc) < αj(θ)
∀i 6= l. When (A1) holds, αl(θc) > 0, which implies α̃l(θ) > 0 for all θ.





This immediately implies that the I − λRS(θc) is positive denite, as it is strictly diagonally







σij(θ)| ∀i,θ 6= θc.
Hence, if the matrix I−λRS(θc) is diagonally dominant, then for any θ, the matrix I−λRS(θ)
is also diagonally dominant.
The rst result that α̃j(θ) > 0 ∀j guarantees that there exists a price, p′l, such that
xil(p;θc) > 0. Since consumer segments have identical preferences, this holds for all i, and
hence at any optimal solution it must be the case that: (a) p∗j (θ) > 0 ∀j and (b) xil(p∗;θ) > 0.
It can be readily shown that the rst-order condition (and therefore the resulting optimi-
sation problem) for the payo vector associated with the payo described in (1) is equivalent
to the rst-order condition of the payo vector associated with the original payo function.
The rst-order condition of the payo vector with individual components described in (1) is
as follows:
α̃ = [I − λRS(θ)]p(θ).
As the matrix I − λRS(θ) is positive denite, it is non-singular and the above rst-order
condition has a solution, which is denoted p∗(θ). Rearranging this rst-order condition leads
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to the expression in Proposition 1.
The rst-order condition above yields a unique, interior solution. As shown above, (A1)
guarantees that pj = 0 cannot be a solution for any seller j's maximisation problem, as there
exists a pj such that xij(p;θ) > 0. Hence, there exists a ε > 0 such that pj = ε generates a
strictly positive level of demand xij > 0. This would yield a strictly positive level of prot,
which implies that j would have an incentive to deviate at the proposed equilibrium.






= 12γ in this setting and dene γ as a m× 1 vector whose jth element is equal








































Proof of Theorem 1
First, note that the expected price of each seller can be written as follows:













It follows then that E[C(θ̃1)] is an increasing function of E[w̃
′′
ij ]. This in turn implies that
E[C(θ̃2)] is a increasing function of E[ε
k
ij ] for each k ≥ 1 for some i, j pair. Noting that εij
is symmetric by denition, it must be the case that E[εkij ] = 0 when k is odd. Furthermore,
E[εkij ] > 0 when k is even.
As each element of the set of random variables {εij} is independent of every other element
of that set, it then follows that E[εyijε
z
lk] = 0 for all y, z ≥ 1 where either i 6= l or j 6= k.
Hence, by the denition of w̃
′′






k] for each k ≥ 1 for all i, j pairs. Given that w̃′′ij = w̃
′
ij + εij , it then follows that:
E[Cj(θ̃2)] > E[Cj(θ̃1)] ∀j.
The above result immediately implies the claim that E[pj(θ̃1)] > E[pj(θ̃2)].
Now consider the ex-ante prot function of a seller j :




Just for the sake of argument, we rst assume that the parameters αj , βj , and each ĉjk
are independent of the price vector p. As E[w̃
′
ij ] = E[w̃ij ] and each element of set {w̃ij} is
independent of every other element of that set, it follows that the expectation prot generated
by observation probabilities with distribution Λ2 would be lower than Λ1. The reason for this
is that: (a) E[pj(θ̃2)] < E[pj(θ̃1)] and (b) (A1) implies that a ≥ (m − 1)c, which in turn
implies prot is concave in pj . Hence, even if E[pj(θ̃2)] = E[pj(θ̃1)], the following inequality:
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E[pj(θ̃2)]E[αj ]−bE[βj ]E[p2j (θ̃2)]+E[C(θ̃2)] < E[pj(θ̃1)]E[αj ]−bE[βj ]E[p2j (θ̃1)]+E[C(θ̃1)], (2)
would still hold because var(εij) > 0.
However, the parameters αj , βj and each ĉjk are not independent of the realisation of
each random observation probability as they are a function of w̃ij Expected demand in this
environment can be written:
E[x̃ij(p




Hence, it follows that:
cov(x̃ij(p
∗),p∗) < 0,
which holds both because (A1) implies that demand conditional on i observing j is falling in
price and because cov(w̃
′′
ij ,p




tion of this fact and the inequality in (2) then implies:
E[πj(θ̃2)] > E[πj(θ̃1)].
for all c > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows almost immediately from that in Theorem 1; in fact it is just a restatement
of that Theorem when Λ1 = ΛD.
Proof of Proposition 3




S(θ)1 and the expression for the equilibrium price vector, it
is clear that the complete network maximises the centrality of each node in G, which then
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minimises the price vector p for a given m. At the same time, as (A1) holds, xij > 0, for each
consumer i and seller j in a complete network, which implies that, holding price constant, i's
expected consumer surplus is maximised where θc = 1. Hence, consumer surplus is maximises
when θ = θc.
Proof of Proposition 4
When c = 0, p∗j =
1
2γ for all θ and all j. As (A1) holds, it follows that for any θ where θc < 1,
there always exists a reallocation that reduces the probability that some other graph Gi is
realised and increases the probability that Gc is realised that increases aggregate demand. As
equilibrium prices remain the same in this case, it follows such a reallocation is prot increases,
and hence the result holds.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the case where θc = 1 and let G denote a graph which is dened as follows:
Gc − Eij = G
for some buyer i and the seller for whom γj is the smallest component in the vector γ. Let
θ1 = θG − θc and p∗k(θc) = p∗k. By the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002):
∂πP
∂θ1
|θc=1 = −ap∗j (γ − p∗j + 2
∑
k 6=j













Hence, there exists a c̄ such that if c > c̄, then ∂πP∂θ1 |θc=1 > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
To verify the claims in the main text, we rst examine the eect of the change from θ to θ̂jk,
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which we dene as follows:
θ̂jk := (1 − ε)θ + εθjk,
on the sum of the prots of j and k, holding pi i 6= j, k xed. Note that in this case, the sum
of these prots can be written:
E[πj(θ) + πk(θ)] =
∑
j,k




As shown in the main text the following inequality holds:
pj(θ) + pk(θ) < pj(θ̂jk) + pk(θ̂jk).
Hence:
ĉjkpk(θ)) + ĉkjpj(θ)) < ĉjkpk(θ̂jk)) + ĉkjpj(θ̂jk)).
Furthermore, given that pj(θ) < pk(θ), and that
∑
j,k pi(θ)(αi − aβipi(θ)) is increasing and
concave in pi ∈ [0, 12γ], it follows that the eect of the change from θ to θ̂jk on the sum of
the prots of j and k, holding pi i 6= j, k xed is an increase in platform prots. This then
then implies that the direct eect of a change in probability vector from change from θ to θ̂j
(i.e. where the proposed set of neighbourhood switches takes place between j and every other
seller in the network).
We now turn the second order eects of a the proposed reallocation when m > 2. By
second-order eects, we refer to the eect of the proposed set of neighbourhood switches
between j and every k 6= i has on i's prots. Formally, we compare:
∑
i





with the sum of prots generated by θ,
∑
i πi(θ). Dene:
∆Ci := Ci((1 − (m− 2)ε)θ +
∑
k 6=j
εθjk − εθji)− Ci(θ)
Recall that:




Two observations follow the above expression. First, as the direct eect of each neighbourhood
switch between j and k increases j's centrality less than it decreases k's, it follows that∑
i ∆Ci(θ) > 0. Furthermore, it must also be the case that if Ci(θ) ≥ Cl(θ) then |∆Ci(θ)| ≥
|∆Cl(θ)|, i, l 6= j.
The two above facts imply that the sum of second-order prices changes is positive and
that the prices of more central sellers increase more than the prices of less central players.
Again, as πP (θ) is concave and increasing in pi ∈ [0, 12γ] for all i, it follows that the sum of
the second-order eects of a switch from θ to θ̂j are prot increasing.
The above analysis then jointly implies that πP (θ̂j) > πP (θ). This implies the result: for
any vector in which there exists a pair of sellers j and k such that Cj(θ) > Ck(θ), there is
always a series of neighhbourhood switches that increases prots. Hence, any solution to the
platform owner's maximisation problem must be such that Cj(θ) = Ck(θ) for all j, k pairs.
Proof of Theorem 3
Consider a proposed prot-maximising vector θ in which (a) Cj(θ) = Ck(θ) for all j, k pairs
and (b) It is true for at least one segment i that ϕi(τ) ≤ bϕ̂(θ)c or ϕi(τ) ≥ dϕ̂(θ)e, with at
least one of the inequalities strict, in at least one graph τ realised with probability θτ > 0.We
also rule out that ϕi(τ) = 0 for any seller i in any graph τ realised with probability θτ > 0, as
this clearly suboptimal.
As each seller and segment is identical in such a graph (prices and preferences are the
same across segments and all sellers), it is possible to construct the following probability
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vector, which yields the same prots as θ. Take a graph τ generated with probability θτ > 0.
As before, let τjk denote the graph generated by a neighbourhood switch between two sellers
j and k being performed on the graph τ . The number of potential switches between i, j ∈ S
and k, l ∈ B is m!2!(m−2)! +
n!
n!(n−2)! := X.
Let θ̄ denote the following probability vector. Suppose θτ > 0. Then the probability that
τ is realised in θ̄ is θτX+1 , which is also equal to the realisation probability of each τij for i, j ∈ S
where i 6= j and each τkl for k, l ∈ B, where k 6= l. As Cj(θ) = Ck(θ) and consumers have
identical preferences, πP (θ̄) = πP (θ). The transformation makes it possible to show that θ is
not a solution to the platform owner's prot maximisation problem





) > dϕ̂(θ)e, where i and j may not be the same segment, and then
consider afterwards the case where one of these inequalities is not strict.
Under this assumption, when the probability vector is θ̄, there is a strictly positive prob-
ability that a graph τH will be realised, where ϕi(τH) > dϕ̂(θ)e and i observes a set of sellers
SH . There is also a strictly positive probability that a graph, τH,L, is realised, where τH,L is
paired with τH in the sense that i observes a set of sellers SH,L ⊂ SH and ϕi(τH,L) < bϕ̂(θ∗)c.
Let ϕ̄i = θ̄Hϕi(τH) + θ̄Lϕi(τH,L),
Suppose τ
′
H is a graph identical to τH except that i observes a set of sellers S
′
H ⊂ SH , such
that ϕi(τ
′
H) = dϕ̄ie. This is ensured by deleting the edge between i and j, Eij , for at least
one seller j where Eij ∈ τH . Let τ
′′
H be a graph identical to τ
′





H ⊂ SH , such that ϕi(τ
′
H) = bϕ̄ic, by deleting at most one edge between i
and k where Eik ∈ τ
′









H ⊂ SH .
Similarly, dene τ
′
H,L as a graph identical to τH,L except that i observes the set of sellers
S
′
H , such that ϕi(τ
′
H,L) = dϕ̄ie. This is ensured by adding an edge between i and j, Eij , for at
least one seller j where Eij /∈ τ . τ
′′
H,L is constructed in an analogous way to τ
′′
H , and hence i
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H ⊂ SH .
Let the constant η > 0 be such that it solves the expression ηdϕ̄ie + (1 − η)bϕ̄ic = ϕ̄i.
We dene the probability vector θ̄
′
in the following way. θ̄
′
i = θ̄i for all graphs except the
















= θ̄L where θ̄
′
H′
represents the probability that the graph
τ
′
H is realised in the probability vector θ̄
′
.
It is clear that each segment in expectation observes the same number of sellers in both θ̄
′
and θ̄. If there is a dierence in prot between the two, it is driven by dierences in prices.









H ⊂ SH and there exists a l ∈ SH but l /∈ S
′′
H . It follows that
c̃jl(θ̄
′





for at least one j, l pair. It follows that the centrality of j and l are lower in θ̄
′
than in θ̄. This
implies that prices are higher across the network in θ̄
′
than in θ̄, which in turn implies that
πP (θ̄
′
) > πP (θ̄).





) > dϕ̂(θ)e is realised when the probability vector is θ, but there is no graph with
positive realisation probability where ϕj(τ) < bϕ̂(θ)c. Given that ϕ̂(θ) is the number of sellers
observed in expectation, it must be the case that ϕj(τ) = bϕ̂(θ)c for at least one j and τ pair.
It follows that if the graph τ
′
is paired with a graph in which i observes exactly bϕ̂(θ)c sellers
in the way described above, the vector θ̄
′
will still be more protable for the platform owner
than θ.
Suppose there exists a graph τ where ϕi(τ) < bϕ̂(θ)c, but for no graph generated with
positive probability by the vector θ is it the case that ϕj(τ
′
) > dϕ̂(θ)e for any j, τ ′ pair.




) = dϕ̂(θ)e and θτ ′ > 0 for at least one j, τ
′
pair.





H ⊂ SH . Hence, by the same logic as the case where both original inequalities were
strict, it must be true that θ̄
′
will still be more protable for the platform owner than θ,even
in the case where no segment observes more than dϕ̂(θ)e sellers.
Proof of Proposition 6
As Theorem 2 shows pi(θ
∗) = pj(θ
∗) for all i, j. When the latter holds, the platform owner's













As every segment is identical in terms of preferences and prices are equal, it is possible to
restate the above prot function as follows:
π̂P (ϕ̂) = nbϕ̂(γp̂(ϕ̂)− ϕ̂p̂2(ϕ̂))− nϕ̂c(ϕ̂− 1)[γ − p̂2(ϕ̂)],
where p̂(ϕ̂) is the highest price level that pertains when the average number of sellers observed
is ϕ̂, which is the result of each segment observing either bϕ̂(θ∗)c or dϕ̂(θ)e sellers in any
graph realised with positive probability.





We can rewrite i's centrality as Ĉi(ϕ̂) as the lowest centrality that pertains when the average
number of sellers observed is ϕ̂. The second derivative of the expression p̂2(ϕ̂) can be written:
∂2p̂2(ϕ̂)
∂2ϕ̂

















i (ϕ̂) < 0 and Ĉ
′




The above inequality shows that π̂P (ϕ̂) is concave in ϕ̂. Restating the platform owner's
maximisation problem as follows:
maxϕ̂π̂P (ϕ̂)
subject to the constraint that ϕ̂ ≤ m. The preceding analysis then implies that there exists a





it uniquely solves the platform's maximisation problem. Otherwise ϕ̂∗ = m is the constrained
optimum to the platform owner's problem. Either way, there exists a unique ϕ̂ that is the
solution to the maximisation problem, which immediately implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let β(θ) denote the m× 1 vector whose ith element is βi(θ). One way of stating the platform
owner's maximisation problem is as follows:
maxβπP (β(θ)),
subject to the constraints that:
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If this equality did not hold, then the platform owner would prefer to change the θ∗ such
that seller i is observed more or less depending on the above expression's sign. Denote the
rst-order conditions of the platform owner's maximisation problem as follows:
πβi :=
∂πP (θ




To understand how πi changes due to an increase in γj , we rst consider a case where ϕ̂(θ
∗)
is an integer. In this case, it possible for the platform owner to increase the probability that
j is observed without increasing j′s centrality. This holds because it is possible because the










In the case where y is equal for all realisable outcomes (which is true when ϕ̂(θ∗) is an integer)
increasing βj has the eect of also increasing
∑
τ θτσjy(τ)y by exactly the same amount, which
implies that
∑
k 6=j c̃jk(θ) remains the same. The same also holds for every other seller: as βj
increases, βi weakly decreases, but
∑
τ θτσiy(τ)y decreases by the same proportion.
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However, recall that:
p∗(θ) = γ − 1
2
C(GS(θ), λ)γ
This implies that ∂pi∂βj < 0 when βj ∈ [0, n], with the inequality strict for one seller. As βj
increases, the number of paths than begin at i and end at j increases of length l ≥ 1 weakly
increases, with the increase becoming strict as βj → n. As the centrality measure is weighted
towards shorter paths, it follows that it must be the case that ∂
2pi
∂2βj
≤ 0 for all i 6= j.
Now consider the case where ϕ̂(θ∗) is not an integer. In this case, increasing βj leads to
an increase in the sum of seller centralities. If βj increases such that j is relatively more likely
to compete with bϕ̂(θ∗)c − 1 sellers, then directly this increases the relative probability that
at least one other seller, i, will compete with dϕ̂(θ)e− 1 other sellers, increasing i's centrality.
If βj increases such that the relatively likelihood seller j will compete with bϕ̂(θ∗)c − 1
sellers remains unchanged, this still increases at least one seller's centrality. The reason for
this is that as fewer sellers are observed in low competition states in general, which, by the
pigeonhole principle, implies that the relatively likelihood that the relative probability of at
least one other seller competing with dϕ̂(θ)e − 1 other sellers.
It is possible that βj increases such that the relatively likelihood seller j will compete with
dϕ̂(θ)e − 1 increases. However, doing so will necessarily increase j's centrality, and by the
proof of Theorem 2 this increase will necessarily result in an increase in to j′s centrality which
is larger than the sum of the total decreases in other seller's centralities.
Given that πP (θ) is concave and increasing in pi ∈ [0, 12γ] for all i, it follows that whether
ϕ̂(θ∗) is an integer or not, it must be the case that ∂
2πP (β(θ))
∂2βi
≤ 0 for all i. Furthermore, as
αi is weakly decreasing in γj for i 6= j and αj is strictly increasing in γj , it is clear that:
∂πβi
∂γj








































This result immediately implies statements (i) and (ii) in Proposition 7.
To see that (iii) holds, rst assume that ϕ̂(θ∗) is not an integer. Let θ∗τ > 0 be the
probability of the realisation of a graph τ in which segment i observes dϕ̂(θ∗)e sellers, including
j and θ∗τ ′ be the probability of the realisation of a graph τ
′
identical to τ except that i observes




∗; γj , γ)
∂θ′τ
= 0.
This holds as otherwise it a reallocation such that increasing either θτ or θτ ′ would be prot
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increasing and θ∗ would not be optimal. As ∂
2Ci(θ)
∂2c̃jk






















which immediately implies that ∂ϕ̂(θ)∂γj < 0, as ϕi(τ) > ϕi(τ
′
).
Now consider the case where ϕ̂(θ) is an integer, then dene τ
′′
as an identical graph to τ







∗; γj , γ)
∂θ′′τ
= 0,
which must hold when ϕ̂(θ∗) < m. If πθ′′τ
< 0, then θ∗ would not have been optimal because




> 0, then it follows that there would be an incentive to put some probability mass on i




< 0 in this case,
However, if ϕ̂(θ∗) = m, such a reallocation would not be possible, and hence πθ′′τ
> 0







Proof of Theorem 4
First note that, by the envelope theorem, the following result holds:



































= 1− 12{RS}jj , where {RS}ij denotes the ijth component of the matrix
RS . By (A1), it follows that even in the complete network, the sum of the second and third
terms of above expression are positive and linear in γj . For small changes in γj prot is
approximately increasing linearly in γj . We will show the result holds in the linear case, and
then show that for larger changes in γj the result must hold.
If E[πP (θ)] were increasing and linear in γj , the following statement holds:
∑
i
E[βiγ̃i|Φ = Φj ] ≥
∑
i
E[βiγ̃i|Φ = Φk]↔ E[πP (θ)|Φ = Φj ] ≥ E[πP (θ)|Φ = Φk].
Proposition 6 indicates that βi = βi(γ̃i) where βi(.) : R→ R and β
′




E[βi(γ̃i)γ̃i|Φ = Φ2] =
∑
i
(E[βi(γ̃i)γ̃i|Φ = Φ1] + E[βi(γ̃i)εi]
It is clear that E[βi(γ̃i)εi] ≥ 0 as cov(βi(γ̃i), εi) ≥ 0 and E[εi] = 0. Hence:
∑
i




As stated above, E[πP (θ)] is not linear in γj . This is because j's price is linearly increasing
in γj , and hence j's prot is a function of γ
2
j . Given that (A1) holds,
∂2E[πP (θ)]
∂2γj
> 0 for all j,
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E[βiγ̃i|Φ = Φ2] ≥
∑
i
E[βiγ̃i|Φ = Φ1]→ E[πP (θ)|Φ = Φj ] > E[πP (θ)|Φ = Φk]
which is the result in (i).
With regards to (ii), we consider rst the case where c increases from 0. When c = 0,
θc = 1 for either distribution, as per Proposition 4. Let θG denote the realisation probability
of a graph, G, in which each segment observes every seller except that i does not observe





When c is suciently low, πθτ ≥ 0 when θ = θc, in which case the optimal solution is











for some j 6= k. Furthermore, ∂|πθτ c|∂γj is independent of γk, as p
∗ = γ − C(GS, λ)γ. Abusing
notation slightly, we can then write πθτ as a function of γk and γ_k, the (m − 1) × 1 vector
of quality parameters not including k, πθτ (γk,γ_k).
For any (γl,γh) = (γk,γ_k), there exists a threshold level of c, c
′
(γl,γh) such that if
c ≥ c′(γl,γh) then πθτ (γl,γh) ≤ 0, but if c < c
′
(γl,γh) then πθτ (γk,γ_k) > 0. Note that,
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when c = c
′
(γl,γh), πθτ (γk,γ_k) > 0 if γk > γl and γ_k ≤ γh or γk < γh and γk ≥ γl. Let
γ̂H = γH + εH and γ̂L = γL + εL, the lowest and highest possible values the quality of a seller
can take when γ̃i ∼ Φ2. As Φ2 is symmetric, it must be the case that:
Pr(γ̃j = γ̂H |Φ = Φ2) = Pr(γ̃k = γ̂L|Φ = Φ2) > Pr(γ̃j = γ̂H |Φ = Φ1) = Pr(γ̃k = γ̂L|Φ = Φ1) = 0.
Let γ̂H denote an (m− 1)× 1 vector with components all equal to γ̂H . When c = c
′
(γ̂L, γ̂H):
Pr(πθτ < 0|Φ = Φ2) > Pr(πθτ < 0|Φ = Φ1) = 0.
It follows that:
E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c = c′(γ̂L, γ̂H),Φ = Φ2] < m = E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c = c
′
(γ̂L, γ̂H),Φ = Φ1].
Suppose the largest component of γ is γh. Let Gj denote the graph in which seller h and only
h is observed by every consumer segment. Let θH denote the probability vector in which
θh = 1.
Let γs. be the largest component of the vector γ_k. Dene Gs as a graph which is identical
to Gj but where i observes h and seller s, and let θs denote the probability that this graph is
realised. Let θd = θs − θh.
For a given quality vector γ, when c is suciently high, πθd < 0 when θ = θH and in this













For a given γh, the incentive to increase θd is greatest when γs = γh. Consider the marginal
eect of increasing θd from 0 when θ = θH , using the envelope theorem:
∂E[πP (θ)]
∂θd
= ap∗s(θ)(γh − p∗s(θ)) + ĉsh(p∗s(θ)
∂p∗h(θ)
∂θd















∂c < 0 and we know there exists a values of c such that θ = θc and that
θ = θH . For a given γh, and assuming γs = γh, then there exists a c
′′
(γh) such that if γs = γh
and c ≤ c′′(γh),then πθd ≥ 0 and c > c
′′
(γh) then πθd < 0. The analysis above relating to
∂E[πP (θ)]
∂θd
directly implies that c
′′
(γh) is increasing in γh.
Suppose c = c
′′
(γ̂H). It follows that:
Pr(γ̃h = γ̂H |Φ = Φ2)Pr(γ̃s = γ̂H |Φ = Φ2) > Pr(γ̃h = γ̂H |Φ = Φ1)Pr(γ̃s = γ̂H |Φ = Φ1) = 0.
It follows that:
Pr(πθd < 0|Φ = Φ2) > Pr(πθd < 0|Φ = Φ1) = 0,
and thus:
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E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c = c′′(γ̂H),Φ = Φ2] > 1 = E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c = c
′′
(γ̂H),Φ = Φ1].
Now consider the function:
ϕ̂
′
(c) = E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c,Φ = Φ2]− E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c,Φ = Φ1].













Furthermore, E[ϕ̂(θ∗)|c,Φ = Φi] is a continuous function, and hence ϕ̂
′
(c) is as well. Hence,
by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a cT ∈ R such that ϕ̂
′
(c̄) = 0. It follows that
if c ≤ cT , ϕ̂
′
(c) ≤ 0 and if c > cT , ϕ̂
′
(c) > 0.
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